When the news media publicize information commonly referred to as "prejudicial publicity," a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial may be jeopardized. In Part I of this two-part article, the author first examines the applicable standards of impartiality which a jury must meet in order for a trial to be constitutionally "fair," and then defines that "prejudicial publicity" which can render a jury unconstitutionally partial and hence a trial not constitutionally fair. Finally, existing methods which have been used in an attempt to Orevent defendants from being convicted by juries rendered partial by publicity are critically examined, with emphasis on the effect of each of these methods upon the co-existing interests of the press, the defendant, and the Government which are sought to be preserved.
In Part II, scheduled to he published in the next issue of the Journal, the author examines the possibility of expanding some of the existing solutions, with emphasis on the importance of formulating and making known to the press, Bar, and police a set of standards delineating the kinds of material which are likely to deprive a defendant of a fair trial. After examining the sources of prejudicial publicity and noting the probable futility of internal control by the press., the author proposes a remedial statute. Results of a poll of lawyers, police officials, and newsmen conducted by the author are tabulated in appendices to Part II.-EDITOR.
In the exercise of their constitutional right to freedom of the press, news media publish information concerning criminal cases. In the exercise of hi constitutional right to a fair trial, every criminal defendant may demand trial by an impartial jury. Often, however, publicity exposes potential or actual jury members to information which is not eventually admitted in evidence at the trial. By thus enabling the jury to consider incompetent material, publicity can be prejudicial to the defendant, with the result that he is unable effectively to exercise his right to a fair trial. Frequent conflict between these fundamental rights constitutes a serious problem to the administration of This article was submitted by the author in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of .Master of Laws, Northwestern University School of Law. M.ay 1964. Minor changes have been made to bring it up to date. criminal justice and raises the question of how the criminal defendant's right to a fair trial can be preserved without infringement of the equally important right to freedom of the press. A third right is also concerned whenever this conflict occurs-that of the prosecuting government to perform one of its vested functions, the administration of criminal justice.
In an effort to formulate a solution to this increasingly serious problem, these articles will review the elements of these three distinct rights: that of the defendant to a fair trial, that of the government fairly to administer criminal justice, and that of the news media to freedom of the press; will attempt to define what is meant by the phrase "prejudicial publicity;" and will analyze the efficacy of existing methods of attempting to deal with the problem in the light of their respec-tive effects on the co-existing and conflicting rights sought to be preserved.' I: AN IMPARTIAL JURY The United States Constitution entitles every defendant in a federal criminal action to a fair trial by an impartial jury.2 Although the Constitution does not require the states to provide trial by jury, 3 every state by its own constitution guarantees jury trials in criminal cases. 4 The Constitution does require, however, that whatever methods a state elects to use for disposition of criminal cases must be in accordance with due process of law; 1 5 Upholding the constitutionality of New York's statutory "blue ribbon jury" system in criminal cases, whereby lists of prospective jurors were limited by occupation, the United States Supreme Court stated: "The function of this federal court under the Fourteenth Amendment in reference to state juries is not to prescribe procedures but is essentially to protect the integrity of the trial process by whatever means the state sees fit to employ." Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 294 (1947) . Accord, Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 605 (1900) (due process does not require states to provide for indictment by grand jury) (" [T] he state has full control over the procedure in its courts, both in civil and criminal cases ... ."); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 93 (1875) (trial by jury need not be granted by the state in common law cases-the requirement of due process is met "if the trial is had according to the settled course of judicial proceedings.").
For examples of non-jury proceedings which, though judicial, did not satisfy due process, see In re Murchiif the jury system is used, the jury must be impartial. 6 Consequently, defendants in state as well as federal criminal prosecutions possess a right to trial by an impartial jury.
To satisfy federal constitutional requirements, the jury must meet the federal constitutional standard in state as well as federal criminal cases. 7 Since this standard is not specified in the Constitution, it has been variously fashioned by the courts. "Impartiality is not a technical conception. It is a state of mind. For the ascertainment of this mental attitude of appropriate indifference, the Constitution lays down no particular tests and procedure is not chained to any ancient and artificial formula." Because "The theory of our system is that conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside information, whether of private talk or public print," 9 the basic question in resolving the issue whether a trier of fact possesses this "mental attitude of appropriate indifference" is "whether he has the ability to decide the facts in a criminal case solely on the basis of the evidence presented in court. Obviously a juror with this ability is the impartial juror required by the fed-, eral constitutional standard. And since, within the scope of this paper, impartiality of the jury is the determinant of whether or not a given trial was fair, nothing less than trial before a jury composed of such impartial jurors is a fair trial. The problem of how to establish the existence of this ability entails" both the substantive test of impartiality used and the procedure for applying the test.
Until recently, with but a few exceptions, the substantive test of whether a juror is sufficiently impartial has been whether he testifies that he can render a fair and impartial verdict based solely on the evidence presented at the trial. If this criterion is met, a juror is not challengeable for cause, nor is his presence on the jury grounds for mistrial or continuance merely because he has been exposed son, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (1948) . 6 Since each state conviction invalidated by the United States Supreme Court on prejudicial publicity grounds had been rendered by a jury of which more than one member was found or deemed partial, the question whether the presence on a jury of one juror who states that he has an opinion which he can lay aside causes that jury to be unconstitutionally partial-and hence the included question whether that test is constitutionally permissible-has not yet been decided by the Court. In Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) or from other evidence that he is not possessed of a state of mind which will enable him to do so." Generally, the defendant complaining that his trial was unfair due to prejudicial publicity bears the burden of proving actual rather than speculative prejudice.u While speculative prejudice is established upon proof of the existence of a condition which might result in prejudice, actual prejudice is not established unless it is proved that at least one juror in fact formed an opinion which influenced his verdict. The "actual prejudice" test compelled affirmance in two recent cases where, although newspapers containing highly prejudicial material were found in the jury room, the defendant failed to prove that any juror read the articles. 14 guilt or innocence of the accused, without more, cannot disqualify a juror who attests to his ability to be fair apd impartial. The trial court must "determine whether the nature and strength of the opinion formed are such as, in law, necessarily to raise the presumption of partiality." Reynolds v. United States, supra note 10, at 156.
1 Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7, 24 (Fla. 1959 " United States v. Leviton, 193 F.2d 848, 857 (2d Cir. 1951) ; State v. Harris, 62 Wash. 2d 858, 863-65, 385 P.2d 18, 22-24 (1963) .
However, it has been held that when potentially prejudicial material has been publicized, a presumption of prejudice arises."5 For example, in Commonwealth v. Crehan, 6 the Massachusetts Supreme Court presumed prejudice because the jury was allowed to separate, and since the trial court denied defendant's motion to poll the jury after damaging articles were published, it was impossible to rebut the presumption of prejudice. In Rideau v. Louisiana ,' where a film of defendant's interrogation by a group of local police officials and his confession were broadcast on several occasions over a local television station, the United States Supreme Court reversed defendant's state murder conviction without even using the transcript of the voir dire examination to ascertain whether any juror had seen the film. The Court held that the highly prejudicial nature and wide dissemination of the film rendered a fair trial in that locality impossible, and therefore examination of the voir dire was unnecessary. Corp. v. State Highway Bd., 123 Vt. 408, 190 A.2d 695 (1963) . Upon finding that eight of the jurors had either read the contents of or heard about an editorial slanted against the defendant, the trial court set aside a condemnation award for plaintiff and ordered a new trial. Affirming the lower court's action, the Supreme Court of Vermont stated: "[T]he test is not whether the irregularity actually influenced the result, but whether it had the capacity of prejudicing the verdict.. .. Indeed, the human mind often may be unaware of what factors influenced its judgment in a given situation." Id. at 414, 190 A.2d Because a trial judge has broad discretion in such matters, an appellate court will not overturn a finding of impartiality unless error is so manifest that the judge's action amounts to an abuse of that discretion."
With this background in mind, we must now try to define exactly what is the "prejudicial publicity" which can operate to deprive a defendant of that impartial jury to which his federal constitutional right to a fair trial entitles him.
II:
WHAT IS "PREJUICIAL PuBLIcry"? The trier of fact in a criminal case must reach its conclusions as to a defendant's guilt only on the basis of evidence presented in open court, and not on any outside influence. A jury failing to accomplish this task does not meet federal constitutional standards of impartiality, and the trial at which the jury is not properly impartial is not "a fair trial" within the federal constitutional re- quirement. Within this framework, the publicity with which we should be concerned is publicity which, if read or heard by potential or actual jurors, may reasonably be used by them in deciding the issue whether a criminal defendant is guilty, and which might not be admitted as evidence at his trial. If jury members are exposed to such material and the material is not eventually admitted as evidence, then the defendant's right to a fair trial will have been violated in that the jury had the opportunity to consider matters not presented in open court in determining his guilt.
For example, in Marshall v. United States, 21 defendant was on trial for unlawfully dispensing drugs in violation of a federal statute. Seven members of the jury admitted having read news articles containing facts relating to defendant's prior convictions for practicing medicine without a license. The trial court had held evidence of these convictions inadmissible on the ground that it was irrelevant to the issues in the case and would be prejudicial to defendant. In the exercise of its supervisory power over the lower federal courts, the United States Supreme Court reversed Marshal's conviction, stating: "[The jurors were exposed] to information of a character which the trial court ruled was so prejudicial it could not be directly offered as evidence. The prejudice to the defendant is almost certain to be as great when that evidence reaches the jury through" news accounts as when it is a part of the prosecution's evidence." 2 On the other hand, where the text of defendant's confession was published before trial, the United States Supreme Court affirmed his state conviction on the ground that since the confession was subsequently admitted in evidence, defendant was not prejudiced by the publication.1 3 Moreover, where a jury was exposed to publicity containing proffered testimony which the trial court had excluded merely on grounds of irrelevance rather than because of its prejudicial nature, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction. ' The case law follows the general test outlined above-if material, read or heard by jurors, was likely to influence their decision as to a defendant's guilt, and if the material was not admitted as 21360 U. S. 310 (1959) .
Id. at 312. 2 Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 192 (1952) . 2-Oxenberg v. State, 362 P.2d 893 (Alaska), cerl. denied. 368 U. S. 56 (1961) . evidence, then the material was prejudicial to that defendant's right to a fair trial.
Six categories of material appear to meet this general test: (1) Confessions; (2) Prior criminal activities; (3) Incriminating tangible evidence; (4) Statements of persons who may not actually testify; (5) Reports of proceedings from which the jury has been excluded; and (6) Miscellaneous inflammatory material which may sway a jury's sympathies against a defendant.
(1) Confessions. No defendant can be convicted upon evidence which includes an involuntary confession, regardless of the truth of the confession, 25 and regardless of independent evidence sufficient to sustain his guilt. 26 Moreover, federal courts must exclude certain voluntary cofessions as well, if they resulted from prohibited official activity? Since the jury must not consider the fact that a defendant has confessed or the contents of his confession unless and until that confession is held admissible, a defendant whose purported confession is published and then not admitted in evidence, whether because not offered or because found inadmissible, is certain to be prejudiced by such publication. Reports that a defendant has offered or attempted to enter a plea of guilty or of nolo S. 643 (1961) , and thus exclude voluntary statements which resulted from (i.e., were "fruits" of) official action violative of due process. See, e.g., State v. Mercurio, 194 A.2d 574 (R.I. 1963) , where the Supreme Court of Rhode Island applied the Wong Sun rule without discussion.
Moreover, state courts must now exclude incriminating pre-indictment statements made by a defendant during a time when his right to counsel was being violated. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964 9 are tantamount to reports that he has admitted guilt, and thus should be treated the same as publicity concerning confessions. It would be extremely naive to expect a juror who has read or heard a statement referring to a defendant as a "confessed killer," or has read or heard that a defendant has confessed or the purported contents of his confession, to put this out of his mind merely because no confession was admitted in evidence and he was told to consider only evidence admitted in court. That in many cases confessions are properly admitted does not in any way vitiate the prejudice suffered by the defendant whose confession, though not admitted in evidence, was publicized. Nor can the general pre-admission publication of confessions be justified by maintaining that it would serve to relieve the public hysteria which often follows an unsolved crime of violence, unless we are willing to cite the desire for public complacency as a rationale for the denial of a fundamental constitutional right. (2) Prior criminal activities. Evidence of a defendant's alleged criminal activities unrelated to the crime for which he is being tried is ordinarily inadmissible in court.
"The state may not show defendant's prior trouble with the law [or] specific criminal acts... even though such facts might logically be persuasive that he is by propensity a probable perpetrator of the crime. The inquiry is not rejected because character [as evidenced by prior criminal activities] is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge."3u Unless one of the few exceptions to this general rule can be invoked, admission of such evidence constitutes prejudicial, reversible error.n For ex-29 See, e.g., Hammons v. People, 385 P.2d 592, 594 (Colo. 1963) .
30 However, this desire may warrant such a rationale in a truly exceptional case. See text in Section IX, infra. 31 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948) .
1 Evidence of other crimes is inadmissible against a defendant unless offered for certain specified purposes. People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901) (1954) . In a few jurisdictions, the fact that a defendant has been arrested, State v. Christofaro, 70 R.I. 57, 37 A.2d 163 (1944) , or indicted, ample, in a rather extreme holding, the Fourth Circuit recently granted a state convict's petition for habeas corpus on the ground that the jury's improper knowledge of defendant's prior convictions in and of itself constituted a denial of his federal constitutional right to a fair trial."
Since evidence of prior arrests, convictions, and pending indictments and accusations of crimes unrelated to the offense charged are all likely to cause the jury, probably through conscious or subconscious use of a "leopard never changes its spots" thought process, to believe that defendant committed the crime charged, publication of such material is reasonably certain to be prejudicial if not later admitted.
(3) Incriminating tangible evidence. No criminal defendant can be convicted by means of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure.1 If the fact that incriminating tangible evidence has been discovered is published in such a way that the defendant is connected with the commission of a crime, he will be prejudiced unless the evidence is found to have been lawfully obtained and is admitted against him at the trial. A defendant can be equally prejudiced by such publicity concerning tangible evidence which may prove inadmissible by reason of some non-constitutional evidentiary rule.
3 5 If, however, the discovery of evidence is publicized without connecting any State v. Goodwin, 29 Wash. 2d 276, 186 P.2d 935 (1947) , is admissible to impeach him; but by the general rule, only prior convictions can so be used. Pearson v. United States, 192 F.2d 681 (6th Cir. 1951) . Admission of facts concerning arrest for an offense other than that for which defendant is presently on trial is prejudicial error. Id. at 698. Even in a jurisdiction where evidence of arrest or indictment is admissible for purposes of impeachment, publication of such facts pnor to the prosecution's opportunity to impeach defendant would be prejudicial to defendant if he does not later testify.
For cases involving the publication of inadmissible facts re criminal activities, see, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) [Vol. 56 TIE PRESS AND THE OPPRESSED particular person to the crime, it is not prejudicial to a defendant even if, for some reason, the evidence is not subsequently admitted. For example, if police discover the "murder weapon," publication of that fact alone would not be prejudicial, while publication of the fact that they found it in the possession of the defendant would be.
(4) Statements of persons who may not actually testify. Since every criminal defendant has a federal constitutional right to be confronted by and to cross-examine his accusers, 36 a defendant may be prejudiced for inability to exercise this right if the news media publish an extra-judicial statement made by a person not subsequently called as a witness against him. Such statements may independently tend to lead a juror to believe that the defendant committed the crime charged, e.g., statements of "experts" regarding the results of polygraph tests, ballistics tests, and other scientific evidence, identification by "eye-witnesses," statements of official opinion that defendant is guilty, statements which might not qualify as dying declarations, and the like; or, such statements could reasonably tend to discredit an accused's possible defense without actually incriminating him, e.g., statements impeaching the credibility of defense witnesses, or indicating that a defendant pleading insanity is actually sane.
(5) Reports of proceedings from which the jury has been excluded. Since a judge's exclusion of the jury from a court proceeding is generally based on the probability that the proceeding will contain information the jury is not entitled to know, publication of occurrences which take place during such proceedings is very likely to be prejudicial to a defendant. Most proceedings of this nature are hearings at which the trial court rules on the admissibility of evidence or confessions. Only if and when the evidence or confession is admitted can the proceedings on which that determination was based be published without probable prejudice to the defendant.-"' U.S.. Cors. amend. VI, applicable to the states by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948 (6) Miscellaneous inflammnatory material. Material in this category may consist of "human interest" interviews with the victim or his family, publication of the fact that a niurder victim's estate is to be disposed of, editorials or factual reports concerning a "crime wave," or reports of the greater deterrent nature of capital punishment as compared with prison sentences.n This type of material tends to be inflammatory-that is, to cause the jury to want to convict-and thus to be prejudicial to whomever happens to be the defendant, not because he is any particular person about whom publicity has been disseminated, but merely because he is the defendant. For example, members of the jury which found a defendant guilty of murder and sentenced him to 299 years in prison later admitted that they had been influenced by articles concerning the then-pending proposed parole of Nathan Leopold.
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It can be argued that, since material of the kinds enumerated tends to disclose The Truth, their publication should be encouraged. However, even if a coerced confession is true, and even if unconstitutionally seized evidence would conclusively establish a defendant's guilt, the United States Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court will permit no state or federal court in America to convict on such evidence. While conceding that evidence of previous criminal activities is not irrelevant and, in fact, is independently probative of present guilt, courts generally refuse to admit such evidence because of its extremely prejudicial nature. Surely only a perverted form of justice would permit jurors to be aware via news media of information which that same justice forbids those jurors to take cognizance of in open court.
III: ExIsTING METHODS
Accepting the above general definition of prejudicial publicity and tentative characterization of specific kinds of material which may be prejudicial, we must now examine the means which have been Rptr. 851, 856-58 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964) .
18 See, e.g., People v. Purvis, 60 Cal. 2d 323, 332-42, 33 Cal. Rptr. 104, 110-16, 384 P.2d 424, 430-36 (1963 used in an attempt to prevent defendants from being convicted by juries influenced by such material. In evaluating each method, its effect upon each of the three co-existing interests-of the defendant, the government, and the news mediawill be considered.
Methods currently available to American courts for the purpose of attempting to solve the free press-fair trial dilemma are: (1) issuing contempt citations against those responsible for publication of prejudicial information; (2) granting of trial level procedural reliefs designed to prevent a biased jury from rendering a verdict; (3) use of cautionary instructions to prevent or erase the harmful effects of prejudicial publicity; and (4) reversing convictions resulting from trials unfair because of prejudicial publicity.
( In the Near case, supra, the Court held that a statute which deemed any publication of a defamatory or malicious nature a nuisance was an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of speech and of the press. The crux of the decision was that the statute, although purportedly describing a corrective process, operated in such a way as to amount to prior restraint, inasmuch as a violation of the injunction against the nuisance was punishable as a criminal contempt. Four Justices dissented on the ground that the statute was not a prior restraint.
[Vol. 56 a contempt dtation4-if, under the circumstances, the words uttered or published create a "clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress [or the state] has a right to prevent."43 Interference with the fair administration of justice, such as by publication of material which presents a clear and present danger to the fairness of a particular trial, is an evil which the government has a right to prevent. Freedom of the press has been held subject to restriction where there was a clear and present danger that its exercise would cause serious political, economic, or moral injury to the government, 4 9 would impede the performance of governmental duties,0 or would endanger the foundations of organized government.
-1 A fair judicial system surely is one of the foundations of our government, and maintenance of such a system a governmental duty. The United States Supreme Court has expressly recognized "the conceded authority of courts to punish for contempt when publications directly tend to prevent the proper discharge of judicial functions."12 The Supreme Court, though, has never affirmed a contempt citation issued for a contempt committed by publication. However, in reversing three cases in which newspapers had been held in contempt for the publication of prejudicial material,m the Court based its decisions not on the per se invalidity of holding newspapers in contempt, but rather on the absence of a "clear and present danger" to the orderly administration of the judicial process in the cases in question. It should be noted that these three cases were not tried before 47 This dictum indicates that, presented the proper case of dissemination of prejudicial material regarding a criminal case pending before a jury, the Supreme Court would affirm a contempt conviction.
The purpose of freedom of the press is to "assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of social changes desired by the people,"n7 and this right thus is essential to our system of government. Arguably, only publications consistent with the legitimate purpose of freedom of the press are entitled to its full protection., In an analogous situation, freedom of the press does not extend to confidential government documents, 9 since disclosure to the press of secret government information could seriously undermine the ability of the various branches of government in discharging their consfitutionally defined responsibilities. It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Frankfurter, eloquently though he may extoll the necessity of freedom of the press, as in the above quotation, recognizes that this freedom must not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with the fair administration cf the judicial system. See, e.g., quotation in text at note 61 infra. Rxv. 197, 200-01 (1963) 
. Cohen, A Frec
Use of the freedom of the press which results in the denial of a defendant's right to a fair trial and prejudices the outcome of a criminal case seems a perverted exercise of that right, and repugnant to its purpose. For example, consider Mr. Justice Frankfurter's pointed observation:
"In securing freedom of speech, the Constitution hardly meant to create the right to influence judges or juries. That is no more freedom of speech than stuffing a ballot box is an exericse of the right to vote." 6 ' The fair comment which serves the purpose of freedom of the press does not include material published with the intent to influence the result of a criminal trial.u Moreover, material published without such intent but nonetheless reasonably certain to have that incidental effect constitutes a "dear and present danger" under a fair interpretation of that test, since the danger lies in the probable effect of publication.u Use of the contempt power to punish a contempt committed by publication of prejudicial material would seem to be -constitutional so long as the clear and present danger test was met, because the action would not impose prior restraint, and the publication would be of a nature inconsistent with the purpose of freedom of the press. 5 ' Another reason for judicial reluctance to exercise the inherent contempt power may rest upon the position of most of our judges as elected officials Although it is essential to our system of government that no person be convicted but by an impartial jury, it is just as essential that no organ of public sentiment be effectively prohibited from making fair comment on that government. Only publications not constituting fair comment as defined above would be contemptuous, but limited restrictions with fair and reasonable beginnings may eventually compound into an oppressive whole. Use of the contempt power may thus projectively undermine freedom of the press even if it would not presently violate that freedom.
-Furthermore, what does it help a particular convicted defendant that the newspaper which helped to convict him has been held in contempt? And future defendants will not be aided by present contempt citations unless definitive standards of contemptuous conduct are established; in absence of such standards, punishment for contempt lacks deterrent effect.Y The prosecuting government's interests are also neglected by use of the contempt 65 "The election of... judges for short terms obviously made them subservient to press requirements." REv. 228, 234 (1931) . "[There is a widespread and firmly established system of trading official information and official favor for newspaperpublicity and newspaper influence.... It is precisely and definitely from this system that the evil of trial by newspaper derives." Id. at 233. Of the persons responding that the contempt power could not be used, 23.73% based their answer on this political reason. See Table IM, in Part II of this article.
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By PUBLICATION 126-30 (2d ed. 1940) .
67Cf. In the Matter of Seed, 140 Misc. 681, 251 N.Y. Supp. 615 (Sup. Ct. 1931) . The New York Supreme Court cited a news photographer for contempt after having been advised that an explosion ensued at a criminal trial when he attempted to take a photograph. Finding Seed guilty of contempt but discharging him in light of his lack of knowledge of the illegality of his conduct, the court stated:
"[This occurrence and similar ones] have been brought about by a lack of knowledge on the part of those seeking to obtain the pictures as to their rights and... duties toward the court. This memorandum is written with the thought that the information therein contained will lead to a proper conduct on the part of those seeking to take pictures in the vicinity of the court." Id. at 684, 251 N.Y. Supp. at 618. [Vol. 56 power, because so long as this process is not uniformly applied according to some standards, it serves no deterrent function and thus does not tend to help secure the effective enforcement of justice in the long run. versible error only where a defendant has been prejudiced thereby and where such failure amounts to an abuse of discretion. 4 However, these remedies fail to protect defendants' rights and the corollary sovereign rights simply because they are so seldom granted, 7 1 5 probably due to the nebulous nature of impartiality 76 and the trial court's broad discretion as to disposition of such motions.
7 Another reason these procedures are ineffective is that, if granted, such remedies as change of venue, continuance, and even new trial, will be unable to assure a fair trial if widespread and intense publicity concerning the trial continues to be disseminated.3 Even 78 Furthermore, it has been suggested that the remedies of continuance and change of venue not only would be to no avail [Commonwealth v. Geagan, 339 Mass. 487 501 159 N.E.2d 870, 881, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 895 (1959 , wherein the argument was advanced that since the prejudice engendered was so strong and widespread that no fair trial which properly could be called "speedy" could be had anywhere in the Commonwealth, defendants could never be constitutionally. tried in Massachusetts], but also would entail waiver of the constitutional right to a speedy trial in the county where the alleged crime was committed. Address by Mr. James R. Thompson, Second Annual Short Course, supra note 75.
Of course, the perils of being tried by a biased jury would disappear if a defendant were to elect to be tried by the court alone, assuming that judges are immune to prejudice. But this constitutes waiver of the constitutional right to trial by jury. "A citizen should not be coerced to relinquish his right to a jury trial.., in order to escape an intolerable situation of a trial before a prejudiced jury." Jones v. State, 185 Md. 481, 486, 45 A.2d 350, 352 (1945) . when granted, these motions have little tendency to deter future publication of prejudicial material.
It would appear that the trial level technique of sequestering the jury (i.e., keeping the jurors "locked up" during the course of the trial) is the most effective way to prevent the defendant's being prejudiced by publicity appearing after the jury has been impanelled. 79 This method has been infrequently employed, however, perhaps because of a desire to avoid coercing the unhappily confined jurors to concur in a hurried verdict. However in a recent case the Seventh Circuit approved the trial judge's sua sponte sequestration of the jury for the purpose of protecting defendant from the effects of prejudicial publicity over defendant's contention that this action resulted in a coerced verdict against him.80 Furthermore, sequestration requires large expenditures by the state.
(3) Cautionary instructions
Where the trial court instructs the jury not to read or listen to accounts of the case which may appear during the course of the trial8 or not to consider any matters other than evidence presented at the trial, 5 V appellate courts generally presume that the instructions were effective and thus find no prejudice due to pre-trial publicity or publicity appearing during the trial accordingly, failure to 79 E.g., in the recent Hoffa criminal fraud trial, Judge Richard B. Austin, N.D. Ill., sequestered the jury. In this case, however, the reason for sequestration appears to have been not only to insulate against the effects of prejudicial publicity but also to prevent interests representing the defendant from contacting jurors for the purpose of threatening or bribing them.
80 United States v. Holovachka, 314 F.2d 345, 349-53 (7th Cir. 1963 ; State v. Cox, 188 Kan. 500, 501, 363 P.2d 528, 529 (1963) (corrective cautionary instruction presumed to have cured prejudicial effects of radio broadcast); Commonwealth v. Crehan, 345 Mass. 609. 188 N.E.2d 923 (1963) (general corrective cautionary instruction ineffective to cure prejudice).
However, current thinking in the behavioral sciences give cautionary instructions has been held to constitute reversible error. 8 6 However, for several reasons, preventive cautionary instructions nonetheless fail to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial and the sovereign's right to preserve the orderly administration of justice by giving him a fair trial. First, they cannot protect against the possible effects of pre-trial publicity, simply because of the time element. Second, jurors may disregard preventive cautionary instructions and fail to admit it for fear of reprisal by the court. For example, in Smith v. Rptr. 104, 110-16, 384 P.2d 424, 430-36 (1963) (trial court's failure to give specific corrective cautionary instruction amounted to approval of prosecutor's argument re prejudicial publicity). 86 236 F.2d 260 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 909 (1956 236 F.2d 260 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 909 ( ), rehearing denied, 353 U.S. 989 (1957 .
87 Id. at 269-70. 88 298 F.2d 133, 136 (7th Cir. 1962) .
11 See Briggs v. United States, 221 F.2d 636, 639 (6th Cir. 1955); Marson v. United States, 203 F.2d 904, 909 (6th Cir. 1953) . Judge Julius J. Hoffman, N.D. Ill., has told the writer that subsequent to decision of the Accardo appeal, supra note 88, which in effect requires district judges in the Seventh Circuit to give preventive cautionary instructions before every recess, a number of defense attorneys have waived the right to such instructions, specifically requesting that they not be [Vol. 56 z-tructions are likely to be ineffective for the third reason above, and also because of the difficulty, if not impossibility, for a juror not to be at least subconsciously influenced by extra-judicial matters to which he was exposed despite honest efforts to remain fair and impartial and to discharge his oath.
0
Exposure to extra-judicial matters not in evidence at the trial may cause a juror subconsciously to resolve disputed issues of fact against the defendant even though that juror is not in fact deciding defendant's guilt on the basis of consciously considered facts gained other than at the trial. Moreover, extra-judicial exposure to matters which are subsequently admitted in evidence may lead a sincere juror to resolve disputed issues of fact, and, perhaps more importantly, issues of credibility of witnesses, against defendant. The pre-admission exposure may well cause a juror to give more weight to the evidence than he would if his first and only contact with the matter were as evidence in court. Many factors are considered by reviewing courts in determining whether a judgment of conviction should be overturned on prejudicial publicity grounds. Invariably the reversible error alleged by appellant will be denial of a fair trial occasioned by the trial court's failure or refusal to grant trial level remedies or cautionary instructions. Hence, the issues reviewing courts discuss tend to establish the p;esence or absence of prejudice.
State or Federal Convicting Court. The question whether the conviction was rendered in a state or federal court is peculiar to the federal courts, since given so that the jurors will not be curious to read what they would have been warned against.
90 See note 11 supra and acc6mpanying text. It should be noted that, even though one may not be consciously influenced by prior exposure to prejudicial publicity in the task of arriving at a verdict, he may in fact be unable to put the extra-judicially acquired material out of his mind and' thus may subconsciously utilize it in reaching his verdict while sincerely believing that he is deciding 'the case objectively and "solely on the basis of the evidence presented in court." For discussion of the subtle machinations of prior experience, see, e.g., allowed speculative proof of prejudice to establish that the constitutionally compelled impartiality requirement was not met by the state jury indicates that the state-federal distinction will seldom be meaningful in cases to come.
Admissibility of Information Complained of. Publicity relating facts unfavorable to a defendant which are inadmissible as evidence at the trial is very likely to be prejudicial, since a juror who reads such publicity will have been exposed to evidence not introduced at the trial, and might consider such facts in his deliberations.9 Con- (1959) . The Court reversed and granted a new trial in exercise of its "supervisory power to formulate and apply proper stkndards for enforcement of the criminal law in the federal courts." Id. at 313. Although such supervisory power is initially exercised to correct prejudicial error, application of rules so formulated may result in reversal where a defendant was not in fact prejudiced, but where such circumstances as were present at his trial may, in other cases, result in prejudice. It may be argued nevertheless that a prejudicial effect existed. Even if the contents (substance) of the publicity were later admitted in evidence, it would appear that a defendant could still be prejudiced, inasmuch as a jury might well be more likely to believe the prosecution's evidence after having been conditioned to it by the pre-trial publicity. See note 90 supra. Even if jurors follow instructions not to read material about the case, this cannot erase the effects of impressions formed derived from exposure to pre-trial publicity. See notes 82-90 supa and accompanying text.
The elusive nature of impartiality renders even the factor of subsequent admission of the evidence inconclusive, since the fact that evidence inadmissible because of its prejudicial nature was perceived by the jury does not technically render a trial unfair unless the jury is found partial under the particular test of impartiality applied. For example, where all jurors, upon interrogation by the trial court, stated that they had not been prejudiced against defendant by a news article published during the trial referring to him as an "ex-convict," the court's finding of no prejudice was affirmed in Rowley v. United States, 185 F.2d 523 (8th Cir. 1950) . A conviction was affirmed for lack of a finding of partiality where there was no proof that any juror had read an article published during the trial which contained the fact of defendant's pending trial for another offense, and where a cautionary instruction had been given admonishing the jury to consider only evidence admitted at the trial. United States v. Griffin, 176 F.2d 727 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U. S. 952 (1950) . 99 360 U.S. 310 (1959) . See text accompanying notes 21 & 22 supra. 100 The crux of the Marshall decision is that the jurors were exposed to "information of a character which the trial judge ruled was so prejudicial it could not be directly offered as evidence." Id. at 312.
Relying on Marshall, S. 56 (1961) , the Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed denial of defendant's motion for mistrial, although the material complained of consisted of testimony which had been excluded by the trial court. Choosing to apply the Marshall rule, the court distintinguished Marshall on the ground that the excluded testimony in the instant case was inadmissible because of irrelevancy, not because of its prejudicial nature. The court stated: "If the conversation had not been excluded, it would have amounted to... additional corroborative evidence of the same general type that was admissible and had been introduced." Id. at 899.
101 Under the Marshall rule, evidence which is incidentally prejudicial to the defendant but held inadmissible because of some evidentiary rule (e.g., hearsay, irrelevancy, etc.), would probably be treated as if it had been excluded by reason of its prejudicial nature, inasmuch as the effect of the material, not the stated reason for its inadmissibility as evidence, determines whether or not a defendant was in fact prejudiced by its publication. This rule is a logical corollary to the rule that actual prejudice must be shown (see notes 13 & 14 supra and accompanyifig text), for without the record of the results of such interrogation, a reviewing court following this rule can have no basis for a finding of actual prejudice. Those courts which adhere to the view that only speculative prejudice need be shown (see notes 15-18 supra and accompanying text) do not require interrogation as a procedural prerequisite to a finding of prejudice on review. Ser., e.g., Briggs v. United States, 221 F.2d 636 /6th Cir. 1955 ). This rule is just as logical a corollary to the speculative prejudice rule, for if the circumstances raise the presumption of prejudice, the reviewing court must find prejudice if the presumption is not rebutted. Moreover, since the speculative prejudice rule does not rely on jurors' answers to questions regarding their bias or prejudice, absence of answers to such questions does not impair operation of the rule. of insuring a fair trial for appellant, proceeded to ask the very questions which appellant's counsel were most emphatically insisting constituted prejudice to his right to a fair trial." Id. at 909. A case which illustrates the possibly disastrous effects of clums-" interrogation is Smith v.
Failure of a defendant to exhaust his peremptory challenges, to challenge for cause, or to move for continuance, change of venue, or mistrial, though not usually precluding the appellate court from deciding the issue of impartiality," may lead the court to infer that the articles complained of did not in fact generate such widespread and lasting prejudice as the defendant would like the court to believe. 109 reversed without remand, by the danger that one who may be a criminal remains at large-while the guilty press is allowed to go free. And, as we have seen, the method which would punish the press by contempt is rarely resorted to.
Summary
It appears that the above methods, as currently practiced by American courts, are inadequate solutions to the freedom of the press-fair trial conflict,u 9 for the following brief reasons: (1) con-19 44.35% of the persons responding to the writer's tempt, because of disuse; (2) trial level reliefs because of disuse and lack of deterrent effect; (3) cautionary instructions, because of human nature; and (4) reversal, because of disuse, failure to protect sovereign rights, and lack of deterrent effect.
poll agreed that the existing law fails to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial. See Table I , in Part II of this article. Moreover, 12.44% of those responding that the law generally is adequate in this regard stated that it is not adequate in highly publicized cases. I/id.
